BANK REFORM (2)
My July paper on Bank Reform published in the Risk Library was forwarded to and considered by UK Authorities. Some proposals have already been actioned; others rejected. This paper adds further suggestions and reviews progress – words in italics are quotes from the original paper.
BANK REFORM
There has been a temptation to leave recruitment of a Chief Executive to the Board of the bank concerned, but this very properly contains industrialists and investors whose primary concern is profitability. There is a conflict of interest between probity and profitability.
This conflict was clearly exemplified by Barclays. When the Chief Executive resigned, the then Chairman was inclined to recruit an investment banker with similar profit making motivation. The Bank of England intervened and the Board appointed Sir David Walker, a former Deputy Governor of the B of E.
The Treasury Select Committee has expressed disapproval at the intervention – believing that such matters should be left to the Board. Surely, it is essential for the future that no such appointment be made without regulatory approval of the appointment proposed.
Professionals sit rigorous examinations but are not allowed to practice without serving as trainees. — Would it be appropriate to have a Chief Inspector who had never been a branch manager or personally inspected a number of branches?
Sir David Walker has suggested that bankers should become members of a professional body which has a Disciplinary Committee empowered to strike them off. Such a body could usefully be modelled on the Institute of Chartered Accountants.
Recent events suggest that the malaise in banking extends well below senior management to relatively junior staff who sell inappropriate products to the public in order to obtain bonuses. It is for consideration whether bonuses at all but the senior level should be banned and replaced by pay rises.
The Financial Services Authority has recently instituted an inquiry into bonuses at branch level.
The nub of the reforms now required is (a) the protection of depositors —
Current UK Government proposals envisage making depositors preferential creditors in the liquidation of a retail bank. Such depositors are likely to comprise a substantial percentage of a retail bank’s total funding. A consequence of making deposits preferential is that if the bank’s bad debts are considerable there will be few assets left for ordinary creditors.
Preference for depositors will impact on other banks willingness to make funds available to retail banks on the Interbank market. What will the credit rating of such retail banks be?
The concept of allowing a ring-fenced bank to fail ignores the fact that there will then be one less lender operating in the market. Contrast the rescued Halifax which does continue to lend.
— and (b) promotion of the UK economy by ensuring that retail deposits are used to finance UK businesses and house purchases.
The UK Government has confirmed its intention to ring-fence banks’ retail operations but stop short of full separation, the details to be set out in secondary legislation. The European Central Bank may impose a stricter separation which in practice UK banks would have to observe, particularly if the Americans also condemn partial separation as doomed to fail.
There is an urgent need to revive bank lending in order to promote small businesses and facilitate house purchases. This must not await the slow process of bank reform.
Banks are under pressure to increase their capital to comply with Basle III; pressure which makes them reluctant to finance customers of no commercial significance to them. It is unhelpful to apply this pressure whilst the recession persists. Preferably, banks should reduce their need for capital by divesting themselves of peripheral activities rather than cutting back on lending.
A primary purpose of having banks is to provide finance essential to economic growth. Regulators need to monitor monthly new lending by each bank to small businesses and to facilitate house purchases. If such lending is inadequate, Central Bank lending to the defaulter could be on more onerous terms. Banks need regulatory guidance.
A solution surely is that in return for having deposits with them protected under the Deposit Protection Scheme, deposit taking banks and building societies must (apply) — a specified percentage of deposits — for lending to UK small businesses / house purchases.
LIBOR
The Wheatley Review of Libor alludes to the possibility of determining the rate from actual money market transactions with automated collection.
It then proceeds to reject this idyllic solution for a number of controversial reasons discussed in a separate paper
The impact on Libor of the proposed ring-fencing of retail banks needs to be considered. Will the retail banks be panel members? If so, will their potentially low credit rating significantly distort Libor rates to the detriment of borrowers and the economy?
THE ECONOMY
Politicians are divided about whether to pursue a policy of austerity and thereby reduce public expenditure and the national debt or a policy of growth to reduce unemployment and social unrest. Too much austerity leads to a waste of resources and deterioration in the national infrastructure. The country needs more houses, better railways, roads and airports.
It is for consideration whether Government debt acquired by the Bank of England with Quantitative Easing could be ‘monetised’ i.e. cancelled and replaced with new debt borrowed to fund construction projects and restart economic activity. In the 1930s, Britain came off the gold standard. Printing a controlled amount of new money is the modern equivalent. All through our history, currency has been devalued to promote growth.
Austerity is required to stem waste of public money and preserve confidence in the currency, but this must not impinge on the infrastructure, housing and other projects needed to kick start the economy. Investment in such projects must focus on British companies – it is counterproductive to kick start the German economy!
James Lingard
James Lingard is a retired partner in Norton Rose who specialised in banking and insolvency law. He was Chairman of the Banking Law Sub Committee of the City of London Law Society for nine years and is the original author of Lingard’s Bank Security Documents now in its 5thedition (LexisNexis Butterworths).